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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of various ￿scal policies, namely, taxes on consumption,
labor and capital when agents have self-control preferences. Agents trade in a stochastic
overlapping generations economy while facing borrowing constraints. We quantitatively
show that modelling choices, such as, liquidity constraints, life-cycle structure and idiosyn-
cratic earnings risks, that were previously considered to be critical in delivering a positive
capital income tax, need not be binding in this regard. We argue and quantitatively show
that for a su¢ ciently large measure of individuals having self-control preferences instead
of CRRA preferences, or alternatively, for a su¢ ciently high cost of exercising self control
when all individuals are self-control types, the optimal capital income tax is zero. Given
there is strong empirical and experimental evidence regarding the existence of self-control
problems, our model provides quite an interesting insight: as agents￿self-control costs rise,
the optimal capital income tax rate will converge to Chamley and Judd value.
JEL Classi￿cation: E21, E62, H55
1 Introduction
Is it true, under fairly general modelling choices, that the government should impose a positive
tax on capital income in the long run? The original answer to this question is negative and is
due to the seminal papers by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) who argued that the optimal tax
plan in an in￿nite horizon, representative agent general equilibrium model calls for zero taxation
of capital income. Since then, several modelling choices that could cast doubt on the validity of
this result were identi￿ed in the literature: Imrohoroglu (1998), inter alia, emphasized that in
an overlapping generations setting where individuals face idiosyncratic earnings risk, borrowing
constraints and life-span uncertainty, the optimal tax system will in general include a positive
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1capital income tax. More recently, in a life cycle model in which households face borrowing
constraints and idiosyncratic income risk Conesa et al. (2009) identi￿ed an optimal capital
income tax rate as signi￿cantly positive (at 36%), and concluded that this high rate is mainly
driven by the life-cycle structure of the model.
In this paper, we quantitatively show that the aforementioned modelling choices, namely,
liquidity constraints, life-cycle structure and idiosyncratic earnings risks, that were previously
considered to be critical in delivering a positive capital income tax, need not be binding in this
regard. We argue and quantitatively show that for a su¢ ciently large measure of individuals
having self-control preferences instead of CRRA preferences, or alternatively, for a su¢ ciently
high cost of exercising self control when all individuals are self-control types, the optimal capital
income tax eventually converges to the Chamley / Judd result, that is, zero.
Along with the ￿scal policy literature, there is a growing literature corroborating evidence
coming from both introspection and experiments, that agents exhibit preference reversals as
time passes. Di⁄erent strands in the literature have suggested that these preference reversals
could be induced by either time-inconsistent preferences, (see Laibson (1997)) or self-control
preferences (Gul & Pesendorfer (2004)).1 Time inconsistent preferences typically assume that
agents have sequences of di⁄erent "selves," each valuing consumption streams in a unique way.
On the other hand, the preference structure pioneered by Strotz (1956) and Phelps & Pollak
(1968) and further elaborated by Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) to model self-control issues provides
a time-consistent model suitable for addressing the preference reversals that does not necessitate
splitting up the consumer in multiple selves. Instead, preferences are de￿ned over consumption
sets rather than over consumption sequences. The key theme here is that self-control preferences
assume that agents maximize a utility function that is a ￿ compromise￿between the standard
utility (or ￿ commitment￿utility) and a ￿ temptation￿utility. The con￿ icting ways by which
agents derive utility in this setting, is the device through which the trade-o⁄ between the
temptation to consume on the one hand, and the long-run self interest of the agent on the other
is captured. The main bene￿t is that self-control preferences remain perfectly time-consistent
and, contrary to time-inconsistent preferences, allow agents in our model to commit.2
1The experimental economics literature documents that subjects who face intertemporal choice problems
often show preference reversals. The ￿rst formal analysis of preference reversals was conducted by Strotz (1956).
Ameriks et al. (2007) among others ￿nd more recent evidence.
2It is nevertheless critical to address a question that lies at the very core of our line of research, namely, why
￿scal policy models with time inconsistent or "temptation" preferences are relevant in the ￿rst place. Several
factors weigh-in in favor of the relevance of these models. A ￿rst one relates to theoretical completeness: a change
in the preference structure enhances our understanding of the mechanics of similar models in the literature by
providing an additional channel through which capital accumulation is distorted. An additional factor is the need
for comprehensive policy evaluation: an augmented preference structure is essential for providing a comprehensive
comparison framework for policy makers in their evaluation of various proposals. Thirdly, empirical relevance:
there is sound empirical and experimental evidence that agents su⁄er from self-control problems. Frederick
et al. (2002) provide an overview of experimental studies documenting that agents indeed exhibit bias toward
immediate grati￿cation. Huang et al. (2007) and Bucciol (forthcoming) study the empirical relevance of self-
control preferences using household-level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Their estimates support
the presence of temptation. Ameriks et al. (2007) develop a survey instrument to measure self-control problems
and apply it to a sample of highly educated adults. They ￿nd that self-control problems are smaller in scale for
older than for younger individuals. Moreover, in a recent paper Fang & Silverman (2009) empirically identify the
2All the above imply that agents that have nonstandard preferences trading in stochastic
environments face a trade-o⁄ between commitment and ￿ exibility, as suggested by Amador
et al. (2006). An environment with a government having a choice out of an array of di⁄erent
tax instruments can considerably alter these trade-o⁄s. Naturally, by now there is a growing
number of studies that explore the e⁄ect of self-control preferences on agents￿decisions and at
the same time examine the impact of di⁄erent ￿scal policies on agents￿welfare. Within the
optimal income tax context, Gruber & Koszegi (2001), Gruber & Koszegi (2004), O￿ Donoghue
& Rabin (2003), O￿ Donoghue & Rabin (2006), and Aronsson & Sjorgen (2009), study the
impact of taxes when agents have Laibson (1997) preferences. The main ￿nding here is that
consumers optimally choose to consume more now and less in the future. Agents over-consume
in the sense that consumer welfare increases with a tax that reduces consumption to a level
which consumers would choose if they could pre-commit to consume less in the future. Thus the
optimal tax rates are generally greater than tax rates observed in the data. When dynamically
consistent preferences ￿ la Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) are considered, Krusell et al. (2009)
characterize an optimal tax rate.3 The authors show that when period utility is logarithmic
the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any ￿nite horizon. Moreover, as the horizon
grows large, the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy, in contrast to the well-known
zero capital tax rate result of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
The aforementioned studies, (in particular Krusell et al. (2009)) that deal with ￿scal
policies under di⁄erent speci￿cations of self-control preferences, have not really addressed life-
cycle issues, thus ignoring the potentially bene￿cial function of a certain class of taxes, as
a mechanism that restrains young agents￿ choices and thereby mitigating their self-control
problems. The lack of an integrated approach in the public ￿nance literature when it comes
to the study of the impact of taxes on agent behavior under self-control preferences may cast
shadows of doubt on the unbiasedness of some conclusions pertaining to the scope of tax
policy under a non-standard preference regime. This is the case because the distortions of
di⁄erent ￿scal policies (social security and other taxes) might reinforce one another and change
fundamentally the trade-o⁄between commitment and ￿ exibility that agents face. It is therefore
essential to approach this issue in a more integrated manner. Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)
and Bucciol (2008) analyze the welfare consequences of unfunded social security when agents
have self-control preferences. Both papers show that the a system of unfunded social security
helps agents to mitigate their self-control costs by functioning as a forced savings mechanism
that e⁄ectively contracts young agents￿choice sets. Hence, social security turns out not to be
as detrimental to welfare as shown by the earlier studies, while in some cases it may even be
existence of time-inconsistency that stems from self-control problems, through the estimation of the structural
parameters of a dynamic labor supply model. Similarly, Gruber & Koszegi (2001) recognize that there is strong
evidence that preferences related to smoking are time-inconsistent, while Angeletos et al. (2001) show that
models featuring time-inconsistent preferences perform better in matching the available consumption and asset
allocation data drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Survey of Consumer Finances. Finally,
the literature documents that the existence of self-control problems a⁄ects fundamentally the economic decisions
of agents.
3Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) explain the self-control phenomenon by constructing self-control preferences that
depend not only on an agent￿ s actual consumption but also on the agent￿ s hypothetical temptation consumption.
3welfare enhancing. In a similar spirit, a certain combination of capital income, labor income,
and consumption taxes might relatively work better in economies with self-control agents in
terms of providing a superior protection against self-control problems.
In view of the above, this paper examines the impact of di⁄erent ￿scal policies, namely, taxes
on consumption, labor income and capital income as well as social security taxes, when agents
have self-control preferences. Agents trade in a stochastic overlapping generations economy
while facing borrowing constraints.4 In such an environment, di⁄erent cohorts face di⁄erent
trade-o⁄s between commitment and ￿ exibility. We consider Gul-Pesendorfer preferences be-
cause: (i) they are time consistent, and (ii) they nest standard utility. This is the case as
Gul-Pesendorfer preferences can be thought as a perturbed case of the standard ones (in other
words, standard preferences can be derived as a limiting case of the self-control speci￿cation).
These properties allow us to solve the problem recursively. Moreover, by maintaining the same
class of models we retain comparability, and hence we can assess the robustness of previous
results in the literature that used standard preferences. Finally, a self-control preference spe-
ci￿cation allows us to have an environment with agent heterogeneity. Thus, we can examine
the impact of ￿scal policies when a measure of the agents in the population has standard pref-
erences while its complement exhibits self-control preferences, which is consistent with recent
empirical evidence.
To explore the quantitative implications of the model we consider an incomplete markets
general equilibrium model that is populated by overlapping generations of agents who can live
up to 65-periods. During the course of life, agents face idiosyncratic income risk, a liquidity
constraint, and uncertain life-time. Before retirement, agents face a stochastic employment
opportunity and hence, they can be unemployed in a given period and receive unemployment
bene￿ts. Employed agents supply labor inelastically. While all agents pay consumption and
capital taxes, only employed agents pay labor income and payroll taxes. After retirement agents
receive an earnings-dependent pension bene￿ts.
Our results here document that if we take into account agents￿self-control problems, then
the highest welfare will be generated by signi￿cantly lower capital income tax rates than those
recently documented in the literature. Given the strong empirical and experimental evidence
with regard to the existence of self-control problems, our model provides quite an interesting
insight: the optimal capital income tax rate will converge to Chamley and Judd￿ s rate as agents￿
self-control problems become more acute, and as the respective costs for resisting temptation
get higher.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our large scale model economy.
Section 3 describes the values of the model￿ s parameters. In section 4 we present results of our
policy experiments. Section 5 concludes.
4The borrowing constraint, for example, has con￿ icting impacts. Relaxing (or tightening) borrowing con-
straint extends (or restraints) the choice set, which in turn has two opposing e⁄ects: ￿rst, it allows individuals
to have more (or less) ￿ exibility to cope with income uncertainty; second, it increases (decreases) the severity of
self-control problem, which is welfare improving.
42 A model of taxation
The framework we consider here builds on the work of Imrohoroglu (1998) and studies the
implications of deviating from CRRA preferences by allowing self-control preferences and het-
erogeneity in the population￿ s preferences (self-control and CRRA ones). This departure lets
us determine the robustness of previous results in the literature pertaining to the consequences
of the tax related ￿scal policies within the life-cycle framework as in Conesa et al. (2009),
Krusell et al. (2009), and Imrohoroglu (1998). This is the case as the class of self-control
preferences proposed by Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) nests those of standard and Laibson-type
time-inconsistent preferences. We follow Ameriks et al. (2007) and conduct experiments by
assuming a certain portion of the population has self-control preferences while others have
standard CRRA preferences.5 Incorporating this fact allows us to quantify the consequences
of the preference heterogeneity for the aggregate economy under di⁄erent taxation regimes. In
the next subsections we provide more details regarding the economic environment, di⁄erent
agents in the economy, and their optimal decisions.
2.1 The environment
The economy is populated with overlapping generations of a large number of agents. Time is
discrete and at each period a new generation is born. At each point in time, the economy has
a time-invariant measure, X, of new born agents that have self-control preferences, while the
remaining new born agents, 1￿X; do not; i.e., these agents have standard CRRA preferences.
We de￿ne z 2 f0;1g to denote the type of preferences agents have. In particular, when z = 0
(z = 1) agents have self-control (standard CRRA) preferences. Finally, the population grows
at a constant rate n.
Agents value consumption and live for a maximum of J periods while facing individual
income risk, borrowing constraints, and life-span uncertainty. More precisely, agents face a
probability of surviving from age j ￿ 1 to j conditional on having survived up to j ￿ 1;which
we denote by sj. Since we focus on stationary economies, age j agents constitute a fraction ￿j







where ￿1(0) = X , ￿1(1) = 1￿X. Note that the sum of these cohort shares are normalized to
1.
2.2 Preferences
Following Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) and DeJong & Ripoll (2007) we model self-control pref-
erences recursively. Agents with self-control preferences face the temptation to consume their
5Ameriks et al. (2007) ￿nds that over 10% of agents in the survey have self-control problems as measured
by the revealed preferences gap. In contrast, over 30% agents have self-control problems according to the gap
between expected and ideal consumption.
5entire wealth at any given point in time. Resisting to this temptation creates a self-control
cost which is absent in the models with standard CRRA and Laibson type time-inconsistent
preferences.
Let W(x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted utility associated with
state x, which is given by
W(x) = max
c fu(c) + 1fi2SXgv(c) + ￿EW(x0)g ￿ 1fi2SXgmax
￿ c
v(￿ c); (1)
where E denotes the expectation operator; u(:) and v(:) are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions; SX denotes the set of agents who have self-control preferences; 1fSXgis the corres-
ponding indicator function; 0 < ￿ < 1 represents the discount factor; c is the commitment
consumption; ￿ c represents the temptation consumption; and x0 denotes next period state vari-
able. Finally, u(:) represents the momentary utility and v(:) represents temptation utility,
respectively. Notice then that v(c) ￿ max
￿ c
v(￿ c) denotes the disutility of choosing commitment
consumption, c, instead of temptation consumption, ￿ c. The concavity or convexity of v(:) is
crucial for our analysis as it determines the overall concavity of the problem.6










In the speci￿cation above, higher values of the scale parameter ￿ > 0, imply an increase
in the share of "temptation" utility, i.e. a higher ￿ increases the importance of current con-
sumption for an agent whereas higher values of the risk loving parameter ￿ > 0 imply that
agents prefer current temptation consumption more than future temptation consumption. The
momentary utility function u(:) is a standard Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form,
￿ > 0 measures the degree of relative risk aversion (and 1=￿ the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution). Notice that this speci￿cation nests the standard preferences. In particular, when
￿ = 0 we recover the standard preferences used in the literature; i.e., Imrohoroglu (1998) among
others. Thus by considering small values of the temptation parameter, ￿ ￿ 0, we can determ-
ine the impact of small deviations from the standard preferences to the behavior of agents as
di⁄erent ￿scal policies are considered.
Huang et al. (2007) point out that only v(c) = ￿u(c);(introduced by Krusell & Smith
(2003)), is compatible with a balanced growth path. For the sake of completeness we duly
produce results when the temptation function takes either form.
6Notice that if v(:) is convex, we need to make sure that v(:) + u(:) is stricly concave. In particular, ￿ > 0,
￿ > 1 and 0 < ￿ < ￿=(c
￿+1c
￿￿2) guarantee that u(:) is concave, v(:) is convex and u(:)+v(:) is strictly concave.
When v(:) is concave, one should show that W(:) is strictly concave.
62.3 Budget constraints
The exogenously given mandatory retirement age is j￿. Agents who are younger than age
j￿ face a stochastic employment opportunity at each period j < j￿. Agents who ￿nd an
employment opportunity, supply inelastically one unit of labor.7 We denote the employment
state variable by e 2 f0;1g where 0 and 1 denote unemployment and employment states
respectively. Furthermore, we postulate that the employment state follows a ￿rst-order Markov
process. The transition probability distribution between the current employment state e and
next period￿ s employment state e0 is represented by the 2 ￿ 2 matrix ￿(e0;e) = [￿i0i] where
i0;i = 0;1 and ￿i0i = Prfe0 = i0je = ig.
An employed (e = 1) agent earns w￿j where w denotes the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of
labor in terms of the consumption good and ￿j denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age j agent.
If, on the other hand, an agent is unemployed (e = 0), he receives an unemployment insurance
bene￿t equal to a fraction ￿ of the wage of an employed agent, resulting in the amount ￿w￿j;
￿ is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.
When agents retire at age j￿, they receive a lump-sum social security bene￿t which we
denote by b. This bene￿t is de￿ned as a fraction ￿ of an average life time employed income,









j￿￿1 for j = j￿;j￿ + 1;:::;J.





(1 ￿ ￿n ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿u)w￿j for j = 1;2;:::;j￿ ￿ 1; if e = 1;
￿w￿j for j = 1;2;:::;j￿ ￿ 1; if e = 0;
b for j = j￿;j￿ + 1;:::;J,
where ￿n, ￿s, and ￿u represent the labor income tax rate, the social security tax rate, and the
unemployment insurance tax rate respectively.
As in the previous literature, our economic environment does not consider private insurance
markets that can reduce employment risk nor private annuities market that provide insurance
for uncertain life span.8 Thus the only private device to smooth consumption across one￿ s life-
time is the accumulation of assets in terms of physical capital (savings). This ￿nancial market
has some imperfections as agents cannot hold negative assets at any period. In other words, an
agent faces a borrowing (or liquidity) constraint.9 As a result, social security partially ful￿ls
7Adding labor-leisure choice into the model requires the modi￿cation of preferences in a way that agents are
not only tempted by current consumption but also by current leisure.
8Although the annuities market exist in U.S., it is very thin (Imrohoroglu, 1995). Hence, our assumption
seems innocuous. In our model, social security partially ful￿lls the role of the missing annuities market (it can
be considered as mandatory annuitization). Diamond et al. (2005) analyze thoroughly the relationship between
annuities and individual welfare. He shows that full annuitization of wealth is optimal under certain conditions.
9Given the size of private credit markets, this assumption may seem not so innocuous. There are two main
reasons behind this assumption: First, we would like to make careful comparison of our results with those
7the role of the missing annuities market. In other words, it can be considered as mandatory
annuitization.
Since death is certain at J and there is no bequest motive, the borrowing constraint can be
stated as:10
(
aj ￿ 0 for j = 1;:::J ￿ 1;
aj = 0 for j = J;
where aj denotes the end-of-period asset holdings. Note that if agents in this economy die
before age J, their remaining assets will be distributed to all of the survivors in a lump-sum
fashion. Let ￿1 denote the equal amount of accidental bequests distributed to all remaining










￿j(z)￿j(z;a;e)(1 ￿ sj+1)aj(z;a;e); (4)
where ￿(z;a;e) denotes the measure of agents with the state (z;a;e).
Given the our economic environment, the corresponding commitment consumption and
temptation consumption budget constraints of an agent are then given by:
aj + (1 + ￿c)cj = [1 + (1 ￿ ￿k)r]aj￿1 + qj + ￿1 + ￿2; (5a)
and
aj + (1 + ￿c)￿ cj = [1 + (1 ￿ ￿k)r]aj￿1 + qj + ￿1 + ￿2; (6)
where ￿c is the consumption tax rate; ￿k denotes the capital income tax rate; r represents the
rate of return from the asset holdings; and ￿2 denotes lump-sum government transfers.
2.4 Production function
Firms have access to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that produces out-
put, Y , by using aggregate labor, L, and capital, K, inputs, which is given by:
Y = F(K;L) = AK￿L(1￿￿); (7)
of the existing social security literature and this assumption is the "industry standard." Second, when agents
are not allowed to borrow against their future-income, this induces an additional boost in (private) savings
for precautionary purposes, since agents may be/remain unemployed with a positive probability. It would be a
fair question to explore the consequences of alleviating this constraint in our environment and allow borrowing
against future income. In that case however, the ability to borrow would lower agents￿marginal propensity
to save (for precautionary reasons), thus implying that the e⁄ects of self-control and ability to borrow against
future income are collinear, hence the e⁄ect of social security on savings due to self-control is non-identi￿able. In
a recent paper, Rojas and Urrita (2004) show that adding endogenous borrowing constraint reduces the welfare
cost of having a social security.
10Allowing bequest motive also changes welfare implications of social security system. Fuster et al. (2003)
make a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework and show that steady state welfare increases
with social security.






h denoting hours of work, and ￿ 2 (0;1) representing the capital￿ s share of output. De￿ning
the capital-labor ratio as k = K
L, we can write the production function in the intensive form as
follows:
y = f(k) = Ak￿:
Total factor productivity, A; grows at a constant rate g and capital depreciates at a constant rate
￿. Competitive ￿rms in this economy maximize their pro￿ts taking prices as given. Production
factors are paid their marginal products. Thus, the real rate of return from asset holdings, r,
and the real wage rate, w, are determined by the following equations:
r = A￿k￿￿1 ￿ ￿ (8)
and
w = A(1 ￿ ￿)k￿: (9)
2.5 Government
The government in this economy need to ￿nance a stream of government expenditures, G, while
providing two social insurance programs. The ￿rst one is an unemployment insurance program
that provides partial insurance against the idiosyncratic earnings risk. The second one is a
social security program that provides partial insurance against mortality risk. Each program





























￿j(z)￿j(z;a;e = 0)￿w￿j; (11)
and
G + ￿2 = ￿krK + ￿nwL + ￿cC; (12)
where C denotes aggregate consumption. Note self-￿nancing is guaranteed if the government
chooses the payroll tax rates ￿s and ￿u endogenously given the social security and unemploy-
ment insurance replacement rates ￿ and ￿ respectively.
2.6 An agent￿ s dynamic program
Since temptation utility v(:) is strictly increasing, an agent who has self-control preferences is
tempted to consume his entire wealth in each period. This implies that the agent maximizes
9the second component of equation (1) with no savings, i.e. setting aj = 0 in equation (6).





a0 + (1 + ￿c)c = [1 + (1 ￿ ￿k)r]a + q + ￿1 + ￿2, a0 ￿ 0, a0 is given, (14)
where x = (z;a;e) is the agent￿ s state vector Es0 denotes the expectation over survival prob-
abilities and the initial asset holdings a0 are given.
If an agent succumbs to temptation and consumes his entire wealth, then
1fi2SXgv(c) = 1fi2SXgv(((1 + (1 ￿ ￿k)r)aj￿1 + qj + ￿1 + ￿2)=(1 + ￿c))
When an agent resists to temptation and consumes less than his wealth, he faces a self-control
cost equal to
v(c) ￿ v(((1 + (1 ￿ ￿k)r)aj￿1 + qj + ￿1 + ￿2)=(1 + ￿c)):
Thus, an agent with self-control problems tries to balance his urge for current consumption
v(c) and long-term commitment utility u(c) + ￿Es0W(x0).
2.7 Steady state equilibrium
In our characterization of the steady state equilibrium, we follow Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)
and Hugget & Ventura (1999). Note that an agent￿ s state vector x = (z;a;e):
Given a set of government policy fG;￿;￿;￿c;￿k;￿n;￿s;￿ug, a steady state recursive com-
petitive equilibrium is a set of value functions fWj(x)gJ
j=1, agents￿policy rules faj(x)gJ
j=1,
time invariant measures of agents f￿j(x)gJ
j=1, wage and interest rate (w;r), and a lump sum
distribution of accidental bequests ￿1 such that all of them satisfy the following:
￿ Factor prices (w;r) that are derived from the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order conditions satisfy the
equations (8) and (9).
￿ Given government policy set fG;￿;￿;￿c;￿k;￿n;￿s;￿ug, factor prices (w;r); and lump-
sum transfer of accidental bequests ￿1, an agent￿ s policy rule faj(x)gJ
j=1 solves the agent￿ s




















where ￿1 is given.
￿ The lump-sum distribution of accidental bequests ￿1 satis￿es the equation (4).
￿ Both the social security system and the unemployment insurance bene￿t program are
self-￿nancing (the equations (10) and (11) are satis￿ed).
￿ Government￿ s budget constraint satis￿es the equation (12).









￿j(z)￿j(x)[aj(x) + cj(x)] + G (17)











In this section, we brie￿ y de￿ne the parameter values of our model. Each period in our model
corresponds to a calendar year.
3.1 Demographic and labor market parameters
Agents are born with a real life age of 21, which corresponds to a model age of 1; and they
can live up to a maximum real life age of 85 years, which corresponds to a model age of 65.
The population growth rate, n, is equal to the average U.S. population growth rate between
1931-2003 which corresponds, on average, to 1:19% per year.11. The mandatory retirement age
is set to age 65 (model age 45).
The sequence of conditional survival probabilities is taken from the Social Security Admin-
istration￿ s sequence of survival probabilities for men in the year 2001. In order to determine the
e¢ ciency index, we choose the average of Hansen (1993)￿ s estimation of median wage rates for
males and females for each age group. We then interpolate the data by using the Spline Method
and normalize the interpolated data to average unity. The employment transition probabilities
are chosen to be compatible with the average unemployment rate in the U.S. which is approx-
imately equal to 0:06 between 1948 and 2003:12 The implied employment transition matrix







11The population data are obtained from the U. S. Census Bureau (the US Census Bureau (2006)) .
12The unemployment data are taken from the U. S. Department of Labor (the US Department of Labor
(2006)).
113.2 Preference parameters
We choose the values of preference parameters ￿;￿;￿ and ￿ in such a way that our model
economy￿ s capital-output ratio matches that of the U.S. economy, which is reported as 3:2 in
Imrohoroglu (1998).
Following Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and DeJong & Ripoll (2007), we let the risk aversion
parameter, ￿, be equal to 2. When agents have standard CRRA preferences we choose the
value of the time-discounting factor, ￿, in such a way that the model economy￿ s capital-output
ratio matches with the long-term average of the U.S. economy. When agents have self-control
preferences featuring a temptation function in the form of v(c) = ￿c￿
￿ , holding ￿ constant,
we choose di⁄erent values of ￿ a priori, and calculate the corresponding values of ￿ in such
a way that u(:) + v(:) stays a strictly concave function. Our parameter value choices for ￿
are smaller than the estimates made by DeJong & Ripoll (2007) and Huang et al. (2007).
This allows us to keep the strength of temptation quite low.13 For every triple ￿;￿ and ￿, we
search over the values of ￿ that deliver the capital-output ratio which is compatible with its
empirical counterpart. We assume that the social security replacement ratio is 60% and the
unemployment replacement ratio is 25% during our search.14
We also conduct our analysis by employing a temptation function in the form of v(c) =
￿u(c). In this case we choose the values of ￿ as 0:0786 and 0:1346 which are in the range of
estimates made by DeJong & Ripoll (2007) and Huang et al. (2007). Note that we adjust ￿
by keeping ￿ and ￿ constant this time.
3.3 Production parameters
The parameters describing the production side of the economy are chosen to match the long-run
features of the US economy. Following Imrohoroglu et al. (1998), we set the capital share of
output ￿ equal to 0:40 and the annual depreciation rate of physical capital equal to 6%. The
rate of technological progress g is assumed to be equal to 2:1%; which is the actual average
growth rate of GDP per capita taken over the time interval from 1959 to 1994 (Hugget &
Ventura (1999)). In cases where aggregate technology is considered constant, g = 0. The
technology parameter A; can be chosen freely. In our calibration exercises, it is set equal to
1:2. All per capita quantities are assumed to grow at a constant rate g.
13Note that the theoretical literature on temptation and self-control problems is still developing and hence,
there are only a few empirical studies that attempt to estimate the parameters of self-control preferences.
14Please note that we could adjust the depreciation rate to match the K=Y ratio while keeping ￿ below one.
The reasons why we proceed with adjusting ￿ instead are the following: First, our models are meant to di⁄er
only in terms of preference speci￿cations. If we adjusted the depreciation rate on top of it, models would di⁄er
along two dimensions instead: preferences and capital depreciation rate. Second, we (safely) adjust ￿ in the
range of empirical estimates (for example see Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) regarding studies that estimate ￿ larger
than 1). Third, capital depreciation rate estimates for the US are more accurate and reliable than the estimates
of ￿. As a result, we opt for adjusting ￿ instead of the depreciation rate.
123.4 Government
We set the unemployment insurance replacement ratio (￿) equal to 30% of the employed wage
and set the social security replacement ratio (￿) equal to 60%, which is approximately equal
to the average replacement rate of the social security system in the US. Alternatively, we can
choose the payroll tax rate (￿s) and the unemployment insurance tax rate (￿u) instead of the
replacement ratios. Since the social security and the unemployment insurance bene￿ts are
self-￿nancing, calibrating the replacement ratios will automatically pin-down the tax rates.
This holds true because agents inelastically supply one unit of labor whenever they ￿nd an
opportunity to work, and changes in tax rates do not a⁄ect their supply of labor.15 Government
expenditures (G) are assumed as 20% of the GDP.
In the benchmark case, we follow Imrohoroglu (1998) and set the values of the capital
income tax rate (￿k), the labor income tax rate (￿n), and the consumption tax rate (￿c) as
40%, 20%, and 5:5% respectively. Lump-sum transfers (￿2) are determined endogenously to
make sure that the government runs a balanced budget. See table 1 for the exact numerical
values of all parameters in the model.
3.5 Solution method
Given a particular parametrization, we use discrete-time, discrete-state optimization techniques
to ￿nd a steady-state equilibrium of our hypothetical economy. Our solution method designedly
resembles those of previous studies.16
A discrete set of asset values (containing 4097 points) is created. The lower bound and
upper bound of the set are chosen in such a way that the set never binds.17 While the state
space for working age agents comprises 4097 ￿ 2 points, the state space for retired agents
consists of only 4097 ￿ 1 points. This is the case as there is no state transition after j￿. The
discrete set of the control variable (consumption) contains 4097 ￿ 1 points.
In order to compute the resulting equilibrium in the economy, we start with a guess about
the aggregate capital stock and the level of accidental bequests and then solve agents￿dynamic
program by backward recursion. The time-invariant, age-dependent distribution of agents is
obtained by forward recursion. After each loop, we calculate the new values for the accidental
bequests and the capital stock. If the di⁄erence between the initial values and the new values
exceed the tolerance value, we start a new loop with the new values. This procedure continues
until we ￿nd a ￿xed point for the accidental bequests and the capital stock.
15However, if we calibrate a model featuring labor-leisure choice, tax rates should be used instead of replace-
ment rates.
16See Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Imrohoroglu (1998), and Hugget & Ventura (1999).
17In particular, the lower bound is equal to 0 and the upper bound is equal to 60 times greater than the annual
income of an employed agent.
13Demographics
Maximum possible life span J 65
Obligatory retirement age j￿ 45
Growth rate of population n 1:19%
Conditional survival probabilities fsjgJ
j=1 U.S. 2001




Capital share of GDP ￿ 0:40
Annual depreciation of capital stock ￿ 6%
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2:1%






Unemployment insurance replacement ratio ￿ 30%
Social security replacement ratio ￿ 60%
Capital income tax rate ￿k 40%
Labor income tax rate ￿n 20%
Consumption tax rate ￿c 5:5%
Table 1: Parameter Values
4 Results
In this section we consider two policy regimes. First, we consider eliminating taxes on capital
income. Second, we analyze a situation where higher consumption taxes partially replace
capital and labor income taxes.
The results of our calibrations are presented in two parts: in the ￿rst part, we perform our
calibrations under the assumption that agents have CRRA preferences while in the second part
we examine the quantitative and qualitative implications that self-control preferences bear on
various taxation schemes.
We follow the common practice in the public ￿nance literature in our welfare and steady-
state comparisons. More speci￿cally, we calibrate our benchmark (status quo) economy to
the US data: capital income, labor income, and consumption taxes are 40%; 20%, and 5:5%
respectively. We aim at generating a long-run average of the capital-output ratio in the US in
each case.
In the ￿rst policy regime, keeping government expenditures, transfer payments, and the
consumption tax rate constant, we gradually reduce the capital income tax rate in steps of 5%
each time and re-calibrate the model economy to the data. The corresponding labor income
tax rates are determined endogenously.
In the second policy regime, we ￿rst examine the e⁄ect of the elimination of the tax on
capital income while maintaining the tax on labor income at its status-quo level. Then, we go
ahead and eliminate taxes on both capital and labor income. In both cases the corresponding
consumption taxes are determined endogenously.
14The e⁄ects of a given policy change are re￿ ected in the changes in the economic aggregates
and the expected utility of a new-born agent.
In order to compare welfare across di⁄erent tax policies, following Conesa et al. (2009),
we compute the corresponding to each case consumption equivalent variation (CEV) which is
simply the uniform percentage decrease in consumption required to make an agent indi⁄erent
between being born under the scenario of a reformed tax system (comparison case) relative
to being born under the status-quo system (benchmark case). For instance, a positive CEV
re￿ ects a welfare increase due to a given reformed system compared to the benchmark case.18
4.1 CRRA preferences
Labor and capital income taxation
In this section we ￿rst calibrate our model economy to the US data under the assumption
that agents have CRRA preferences while keeping the capital income, labor income, and con-
sumption taxes at 40%; 20%, and 5:5% respectively. In all tables, the values of the economic
aggregates are normalized to 100 under the status quo economy. The values of the various tax
schemes in terms of welfare are calculated accordingly. In Table 2, we set ￿ = 0:991. The
capital-output ratio and the interest rate in the status-quo economy is 3:1 and 6:7% respect-
ively. These values are close enough to the values reported by Kydland & Prescott (1996)
for the US economy.The e⁄ects that the resulting nine competing scenarios have on economic
aggregates, as well as their welfare implications are reported in Table 2.
￿k(%) ￿n(%) K C Y r(%) CEV (%)
40 20 100 100 100 6:70 0
35 21:610 104:103 101:028 101:553 6:41 0:0593
30 23:030 108:079 101:972 103:049 6:14 0:1206
25 24:460 111:422 102:764 104:327 5:92 0:0073
20 25:850 114:655 103:489 105:549 5:72 ￿0:1716
15 27:220 117:619 104:129 106:685 5:53 ￿0:4376
10 28:540 120:959 104:753 107:812 5:35 ￿0:7267
5 29:870 123:941 105:258 108:778 5:20 ￿1:1327
0 31:250 125:619 105:629 109:498 5:09 ￿1:7458
Table 2: CRRA-no growth
Our results in Table 2 show that if we were to completely eliminate the capital income tax
while at the same time keeping the transfer payments and the government expenditures at their
benchmark levels, the capital stock would naturally increase by 25:6%. Note that this increase
in the capital stock comes at the expense of an increase in the labor income tax from 20% to
18In other words, we calculate welfare by using the value function in equation 13 and transform into consump-
tion units. When agents have CRRA and Krusell-Smith type of self-control preferences, the welfare consequences
of switching from a steady-state allocation x0 to x￿ is given by CEV = [
W(x￿)
W(x0)]
1=(1￿￿) ￿ 1. When agents have
temptation utility in the form of v(c) = ￿
c￿
￿ ; we use CEV = [
W(x￿)
W(x0)]
1=(1￿￿￿￿) ￿1 to make welfare comparisons.
1531:3%. The level of aggregate consumption increases by just 5:6% hinting to a small capital
stock e⁄ect. Our economy is dynamically e¢ cient at all levels of the capital income tax rate
and hence, reducing or even eliminating the capital income tax rate makes our economy closer
to its golden-rule steady state level. From Table 2 we see that highest steady-state welfare is
generated when the capital income tax rate is 30%: This signi￿cantly high positive tax rate is
in line with the ￿ndings of Conesa et al. (2009) who show that a capital income tax rate of a
36% magnitude is optimal.
In line with Imrohoroglu (1998), we observe that eliminating the capital income tax creates
a trade-o⁄ between the positive capital stock e⁄ect on the one hand, and the negative con-
sumption pro￿le e⁄ect on the other. In other words, on the one hand, aggregate consumption
and welfare increase as a result of an increase in the capital stock. On the other hand, the tax
burden shifts from agents with low saving propensities to agents with high saving propensities.
The lost revenue for the government from eliminating the capital tax rate is made up by an
increase in the labor income tax rate. This shift in the tax burden reduces welfare as a res-
ult of its negative e⁄ects on agents￿ability to smooth out consumption and to insure against
risks pertaining to future income ￿ uctuations and longevity. Thus, the presence of a budget
constraint and the timing of the tax burden over the life-cycle might give rise in a welfare
maximizing capital income tax rate that is positive. Our results indicate that the timing of tax
burden is important and the consumption pro￿le e⁄ect dominates the capital stock e⁄ect at a
capital income tax rate of 30%.
Note that in this environment agents supply labor inelastically. When on the other hand we
allow for an endogenous labor-leisure choice the above result would be further ampli￿ed: higher
labor income tax rates will have more severe allocative consequences. This, in turn, will push
the optimal capital tax rate further up. Conesa et al. (2009) show that the optimal capital
income tax rate is signi￿cantly higher when the model incorporates labor-leisure choice.
Consumption taxation
In this section we compare the two alternatives of the status quo economy. We present the
results of the three alternative tax schemes in Table 3.
￿k(%) ￿n(%) ￿c K C Y r(%) CEV (%)
40 20 5:500 100 100 100 6:840 0
0 20 10:410 138:989 107:959 114:066 4:540 8:028
0 0 18:050 162:169 110:720 121:333 3:610 24:595
Table 3: Alternative tax bases - CRRA no-growth
When the capital income tax is replaced with a higher consumption tax, the capital stock
increases by 38:9%. Going one step further, when we replace both labor and capital income
taxes with an even higher consumption tax, the capital stock increases by 62:2%. In both cases
there is substantial utility gain as re￿ ected in the higher CEV values reported. Our results are
16in line with those of the previous studies, in particular those of Imrohoroglu (1998) and the
intuition is clear: the capital stock e⁄ect is larger and the consumption pro￿le e⁄ect is smaller
since the consumption tax removes the distortion on private saving and smooths out the tax
burden over the life-cycle.
4.2 Self-control preferences
4.2.1 Two dimensional temptation function (v(c) = ￿c￿
￿ )
In this section we present our results for an economy in which agents have self-control pref-
erences and compare the e⁄ects of the various tax schemes on both economic aggregates and
social welfare with the results obtained in the respective cases involving CRRA preferences
analyzed in the previous section.
We assume that temptation utility takes the form v(c) = ￿c￿
￿ . Note that in this case, in
order to have balanced growth we need to assume that aggregate technology remains constant
i.e. there is no growth.
Before presenting our results, we ￿rst explain the behavioral implications of the existence
of temptation and then quantify the e⁄ects of temptation on economic aggregates. We then
proceed by quantifying the steady-state levels of capital accumulation and consumption under
the assumption that agents have self-control preferences. In doing this, we ￿rst keep ￿ ￿xed at
2 and vary ￿, then we keep ￿ constant at 0:00009 and vary ￿ while keeping the annual discount
factor at its no-growth CRRA level throughout the exercise. Tables 4 and 5 display our results
for both cases.
￿ K eK Y eY
0:00025 100 100
0:00050 91:063 0:089 96:326 0:037
0:00075 84:402 0:146 93:464 0:059
0:001 72:298 0:181 91:134 0:074
Table 4: Changes in the strength of ￿
Table 4 demonstrates that an increase in the intensity of temptation distorts capital ac-
cumulation and output severely. In order to perform meaningful comparisons we calculate
elasticities associated with each aggregate variable. An initial 1% increase in the values of ￿,
gives rise to a 0:09% decrease in the aggregate capital stock. Subsequent equal step increases in
the numerical value of ￿ create increasingly higher distortions on the aggregate capital stock.
Similarly, while an initial 1% increase in ￿ causes a 0:037% decrease in aggregate output, further
equal step increases in ￿ create higher distortions in aggregate output.
Table 5 shows the e⁄ects of an increase in an agent￿ s willingness to substitute current
temptation consumption with future temptation consumption. Higher values of ￿ mean that
agents prefer more current temptation consumption. Not surprisingly, higher values of ￿ result
in a reduction in the steady-state level of capital and output. An initial 1% increase in ￿ creates
17￿ K eK Y eY
2 100 100
3 75:182 0:496 89:220 0:216
4 49:115 1:040 75:266 0:469
5 35:882 1:077 66:368 0:473
Table 5: Changes in the strength of ￿
a 0:49% decrease in K and a 0:22% decrease in Y while further increases give rise to higher
distortions on K and Y .
Labor and capital income taxation
Now, our model di⁄ers from Imrohoroglu (1998) and Conesa et al. (2009) in terms of preference
speci￿cation.
In Table 6 we present our results when agents su⁄er from moderate self-control problems.
This table is generated by assuming ￿ = 0:005 and ￿ = 1:045. As in the benchmark case,
the model is able to generate a capital-output ratio and an interest rate close enough to their
empirical estimates.
￿k(%) ￿n(%) K C Y r(%) CEV (%)
40 20 100 100 100 6.550 0
35 21.640 102.013 100.520 100.799 6.400 0.041
30 23.230 104.185 101.056 101.625 6.250 0.083
25 24.780 106.480 101.609 102.508 6.090 0.121
20 26.340 108.328 102.045 103.221 5.960 0.128
15 27.880 110.190 102.464 103.926 5.840 0.125
10 29.390 111.929 102.866 104.592 5.730 0.112
5 30.870 113.824 103.252 105.287 5.610 0.095
0 32.350 115.622 103.587 105.907 5.510 0.062
Table 6: Self-control preferences I
Our results in Table 6 show that, the complete elimination of the capital income tax rate
increases the capital stock by 15:6%. This rate is comparatively lower than that of the pre-
vious section. The intuition here lies behind the fact that agents with self-control preferences
inherently save less than agents with standard preferences. As a result, eliminating the capital
income tax is not as e⁄ective as in the previous section in terms of increasing the capital stock.
Not surprisingly, the level of aggregate consumption increases comparatively less as well. As
it was the case in the previous section, the economy is dynamically e¢ cient and therefore, any
reduction in the capital income tax rate would raise steady-state welfare as the steady-state
capital stock would rise toward the golden-rule level. In this economy welfare is maximized
at a 20% capital tax rate which is lower than the corresponding rate obtained in the previous
section.
18Higher taxes on labor income mitigate workers￿self-control cost. Self-control cost tends
to be particularly high in the mid-to-old-age years when agents earn higher wage income and
have higher accumulated assets. In these age brackets, imposing a tax on labor income can be
an e⁄ective tool to mitigate self-control cost. Accordingly, a tax on capital income can play a
similar to the above role in mitigating self-control costs. However, a capital income tax reaches
its maximum potential as a self-control cost reducing device during the early retirement ages
in which agents￿asset holdings reach their maximum (and wage income is zero).
In the previous section dealing with CRRA agents we identi￿ed the main trade-o⁄ between
decreasing capital income tax rate and increasing labor income tax rate as a positive capital
stock e⁄ect versus a negative consumption pro￿le e⁄ect. Yet, when agents have self-control
preferences, higher taxes on labor income come with a bene￿t: reducing self-control costs.
This in turn mitigates the negative consumption pro￿le e⁄ect of higher labor income taxes.
￿k(%) ￿n(%) K C Y r(%) CEV (%)
40 20 100 100 100 6:560 0
35 21:670 101:925 100:504 100:753 6:450 0:099
30 23:270 103:971 101:007 101:544 6:310 0:193
25 24:870 105:917 101:494 102:307 6:170 0:277
20 26:460 107:625 101:897 102:947 6:060 0:339
15 28:020 109:336 102:300 103:615 5:940 0:397
10 29:580 110:935 102:653 104:209 5:840 0:442
5 31:080 112:717 103:039 104:868 5:730 0:488
0 32:590 114:212 103:375 105:442 5:630 0:518
Table 7: Self-control preferences II
In Table 7 we present our results when agents su⁄er from severe temptation. This table is
generated by assuming ￿ = 0:0075 and ￿ = 1:070. The benchmark model is able to generate a
capital-output ratio and an interest rate close enough to their empirical estimates.
It is noteworthy that a complete elimination of the capital tax rate in this case generates a
capital stock increase only equal to 14:2%. This re￿ ects nothing but the increasingly dominant
role of the self control problem in agents￿saving decisions. The level of aggregate consumption
is increased by 3:38%. The interesting result here is the following: When agents have severe
self-control problems, a 0% capital income tax is the rate that gives rise to the highest welfare.
In other words, in this environment, the self-control cost reducing potential of a labor income
tax rate is overriding in terms of e⁄ectiveness any other ￿scal instrument.
Recent studies using life-cycle frameworks in incomplete market settings showed that the
well-known Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) zero capital tax rate result does not hold in
general, and that the capital income tax rate should be signi￿cantly higher (see Imrohoroglu
(1998) and Conesa et al. (2009)) in these environments. However, our results here document
that if we factor in agents￿self-control problems, then the highest welfare will be generated by
signi￿cantly lower capital tax rates. Given the strong empirical and experimental evidence with
19regard to the existence of self-control problem driven preference reversals, our model provides
quite an interesting insight: the optimal capital income tax rate will converge to the Chamley
and Judd rate as agents￿self-control problems become more acute, and as the respective costs
for resisting temptation get higher.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
￿K(%) K CEV (%) K CEV (%) K CEV (%)
40 100 100 100
35 103:776 0:117 103:036 0:001 102:484 0:052
30 107:706 0:222 106:463 0:039 105:017 0:089
25 110:723 0:045 109:601 ￿0:019 107:548 0:113
20 113:904 ￿0:094 112:255 ￿0:134 109:762 0:100
15 117:006 ￿0:316 114:933 ￿0:287 111:944 0:079
10 119:994 ￿0:583 117:747 ￿0:426 114:066 0:043
5 122:310 ￿1:002 119:826 ￿0:626 116:257 ￿0:016
0 124:826 ￿1:430 123:320 ￿0:816 117:979 ￿0:083
Table 8: Preference Heterogeneity
Now we focus our attention to economies in which a certain proportion is populated by self-
control agents while the remaining population has standard preferences. We compare three
model economies that di⁄er in terms of population composition:
￿ in Model I, 90% of agents have standard preferences while the remaining 10% of agents
have self-control preferences;
￿ in Model II, 50% of agents have standard preferences while the remaining 50% of agents
have self-control preferences;
￿ in Model III, 10% of agents have standard preferences while the remaining 90% have
self-control preferences.
In all models agents￿self-control preference parameter values and CRRA preference para-
meter values are the same, i.e., ￿ = 0:0075; ￿ = 2; ￿ = 1:8. The time-discount factor ￿,
however, is adjusted in each case in order to ensure that the capital-output ratios and interest
rates generated are su¢ ciently close to their empirical estimates in the benchmark cases. Fol-
lowing this guideline, we set ￿ to 0:994, 1:003, and 1:030 in models I, II, and III respectively.
Results are documented in Table 8.
In Model I, eliminating the capital income tax rate increases the capital stock by 24:8%. In
this economy, a 30% capital income tax rate maximizes welfare. In Model II, eliminating the
capital income tax rate increases the capital stock by 23:2%. In this economy, a 30% capital
income tax rate maximizes welfare as well. In Model III, eliminating the capital income tax rate
increases the capital stock by 17:9% while a 25% capital income tax rate maximizes welfare.
20Thus, our analysis provides a ￿rst indication in support of the fact that as the share of
agents with self-control preferences in the population increases, the capital income tax rate
that generates the highest welfare decreases.
In interpreting the above result we will ￿rst invoke, inter alia, some recent related studies
that analyze the e⁄ects of various social security arrangements when agents face self-control
problems which are modeled by either time-inconsistent or self-control (Gul & Pesendorfer)
preferences. Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008), Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011), and Bucciol (2008)
document that a higher payroll tax rate associated with a higher social security replacement
rate might improve welfare to a considerable degree. The channel through which this result
obtains, is the restrainment of agents￿choice sets and the consequent mitigation of agents￿
self-control problems.
In our environment, higher labor income taxes play a similar role as that of higher payroll
taxes and help agents to partly overcome their self-control problems to the extent of the depriva-
tion of any extra consumption possibilities. This, in turn, implies that the welfare reducing
negative consumption pro￿le e⁄ect of higher labor income taxes is mitigated. Therefore, the
usefulness of labor income taxes critically hinges on which out of these two competing e⁄ects
eventually prevails:
Now, although the negative consumption pro￿le e⁄ect seems to dominate the additional
bene￿t stemming from the restriction of self control agents￿choice sets, relatively higher labor
income taxes needed to make up for the lower capital income taxes (in order to balance the
budget) can be overall welfare improving when agents have moderate self-control problems.
Interestingly, for severe self-control problems, the additional bene￿t stemming from the restric-
tion of self control agents￿choice sets completely dominates the negative consumption pro￿le
e⁄ect and then, the highest possible labor income tax (implying a zero capital income tax rate)
can be sustained as the welfare maximizing option.
In conclusion, our results are in line with those of previous studies in the social security
literature in terms of emphasizing the welfare improving potential of taxes imposed on labor
income.
However, what is missing from all previous studies (in both social security and capital
taxation literature) is an integrated assessment of the combined e⁄ects of the relevant trade-
o⁄s, both along the dimension of di⁄erences in preferences (in particular characterized by
self-control problems) and along the dimension of the scope of capital income taxation versus
labor income taxation. What is therefore identi￿ed and quantitatively assessed for the ￿rst time
in the ￿scal policy literature, is yet another dimension of a trade-o⁄which is due to the agents￿
enhanced preference speci￿cation, and the e⁄ect of its interplay with the formerly identi￿ed
trade-o⁄s pertaining to capital income taxation versus labor income taxation. It turns out that
this latter e⁄ect may reverse a well known result that was previously mistakenly attributed to
borrowing constraints and the life-cycle structure of the model.
Notice that a capital income tax provides a similar self-control cost reducing bene￿t as a
labor income tax since both ￿scal instruments, either immediately or with a time lag, restrain
21agents￿choice sets. Yet, a high labor income tax provides a relatively larger additional bene￿t
that is applicable to agents￿resources during a longer period of time. This is because agents￿
wage income is higher than their income from asset holdings most of the life-span. The latter
remark applies a fortiori for self control agents whose asset holdings at retirement are expected
to be even lower compared to those of their CRRA counterparts, and hence an increased capital
income tax rate will bite even less in their case.
Consumption taxation
In this section we consider replacing partly or in whole the capital income tax (and the labor
income tax) with a consumption tax.
As we can see from Table 9 the capital stock increases by 22:1% and CEV is 1:303% when
the capital income tax is replaced with a higher consumption tax. When we replace both labor
and capital income taxes with a higher consumption tax the capital stock increases by 25:9%
and CEV is 3%.
￿k(%) ￿n(%) ￿c K C Y r(%) CEV (%)
40 20 5.500 100 100 100 6.840
0 20 12.060 122.059 102.843 108.308 5.390 1.303
0 0 20.870 125.945 103.132 109.681 5.180 2.994
Table 9: Alternative tax bases - Self-control preferences I
Table 10 presents our results when agents have severe temptation: although replacing the
capital income and labor income taxes with a consumption tax is still the best option from
a welfare standpoint, this substitution does not generate any astonishing increases in capital
stock and welfare.
￿k(%) ￿n(%) ￿c K C Y r(%) CEV (%)
40 20 5:500 100 100 100 6:770 0
0 20 12:180 119:661 102:551 107:450 5:460 1:089
0 0 21:080 121:211 102:685 107:944 5:370 2:098
Table 10: Alternative tax bases - Self-control preferences II
In addition to that, a quick comparison of the results in this section with the results of the
CRRA case reveals that self-control agents do not bene￿t much from the substitution of capital
and labor income taxes by a higher consumption tax. When agents have standard preferences,
a substitution of the capital income tax by a consumption tax gives rise to a huge welfare
gain (8.03% increase in CEV) in contrast to moderate gains in economies with self-control
agents (1.30% and 1.01% respectively). In the CRRA case, the abolishment of both capital
and labor income taxes creates an astonishing welfare improvement (24.59% increase in CEV),
but the exact same scenario creates substantially lower welfare improvement when agents have
22self-control problems (2.99% and 2.09% increases respectively).
This result clearly demonstrates that from the perspective of self-control agents, higher
labor income taxes and higher capital income taxes are much less detrimental to welfare.
This is the case because self-control agents value the relief (in terms of the cost of exerting
self-control) provided by higher capital and labor income tax rates.
To summarize, agents with a two-dimensional self-control problem prefer a signi￿cantly
di⁄erent tax rate mix compared to their counterparts that have standard preferences.
4.2.2 One-dimensional temptation function (v(c) = ￿u(c))
Labor and capital income taxation
In this section, agents￿ temptation is one-dimensional and is captured by the temptation
strength parameter ￿ only. For the moderate temptation case we set ￿ = 0:0786 and ￿ = 1:02
while for the severe temptation case we set ￿ = 0:1572 and ￿ = 1:025. In the benchmark
economies we were able to generate the capital-output ratios and interest rates that are close
enough to their estimates. Note that this temptation function is consistent with a balanced
growth path and therefore we can assume that there is positive economic growth here. In
order to make meaningful comparison with standard preferences case, we re-calibrated CRRA
economies under the assumption of positive economic growth. See Table 11.
CRRA (growth)
￿k(%) ￿n(%) K CEV
40 20 100 0
35 21:510 103:093 0:222
30 23:030 107:185 0:231
25 24:500 110:672 0:236
20 25:970 113:633 0:071
15 27:420 116:518 ￿0:151
10 28:830 119:237 ￿0:429
5 30:250 121:679 ￿0:828
0 31:620 124:286 ￿1:214
Self-control pref. III





















Table 11: Labor and capital income taxation
Note that when agents￿temptation is captured by a function in the form of v(c) = ￿u(c),
the self-control problem is not as acute compared to the case captured by a function in the form
of v(c) = ￿c￿
￿ . This happens because in the latter form, temptation comes from two sources:
temptation towards current consumption and preference of current temptation consumption
to future temptation consumption. In the former form, however, temptation comes only from
one source, that is, temptation towards current consumption. As a result, although the values
of temptation strength parameters are relatively higher in the former form, the levels of self-
control cost are lower for a given set of choices the agent faces. This is best re￿ ected in the
changes in the capital stock levels. When agents have an one-dimensional temptation function,
23eliminating the capital income tax rate increases the capital stock more. While 25% capital
income tax rate maximizes welfare in the CRRA case, 20% and 15% capital income tax rates
maximize the welfare in the cases of moderate and severe temptation respectively (i.e. self-
control preferences III and self-control preferences IV). This shows that the existence of a labor
income tax provides self-control relief when agents have one dimensional temptation function
as well.
Consumption taxation
Following our earlier practice, in this section we compare three alternative tax schemes: (i)
the status-quo (￿k = 40%, ￿n = 20%, ￿c = 5%), (ii) abolishing the capital income tax while
adjusting the consumption tax (￿k = 0%, ￿n = 20%), and (iii) abolishing both capital income
and labor income tax rates while adjusting the consumption tax (￿k = 0% and ￿n = 0%) ac-
cordingly. Since the one-dimensional temptation function is consistent with balanced growth,
we re-calibrate the CRRA economy by assuming a positive economic growth in order to make
a meaningful comparison with moderate and severe self-control economies (self-control prefer-
ences III and self-control preferences IV). Results are provided in Table 12.
CRRA - growth














Table 12: Alternative tax bases
Our results here demonstrate that when agents face one-dimensional temptation, substitut-
ing capital and labor income taxes with higher consumption taxes increase the capital stock
and improve the welfare at the similar rates as in the CRRA economy. This is not a surprising
result, since one-dimensional temptation function is by construction a smooth and continuous
departure from standard preferences.
5 Conclusion
There is a growing number of studies that explore the e⁄ect of self-control preferences on agents￿
decisions. At the same time, there is an increasing number of recent studies using life-cycle
frameworks in incomplete market settings showing that the well-known Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985) zero capital tax rate result does not hold in general, and that the capital income
tax rate should be signi￿cantly higher in these environments.
This paper combines the aforementioned literature strands with a view to revisit the ques-
tion of whether eliminating capital income taxation can be optimal under non-standard pref-
erence speci￿cations. To explore the quantitative implications of the model we consider an
24incomplete market general equilibrium model that is populated by overlapping generations of
agents who can live up to 65-periods. During the course of life, agents face idiosyncratic income
risk, a liquidity constraint, and uncertain life-time.
More speci￿cally, we use this setting to examine the impact of di⁄erent ￿scal policies,
namely, taxes on consumption, labor and capital as well as social security taxes, when agents
have "Gul & Pesendorfer" self-control preferences. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the
￿scal policies as described above when a measure of the agents in the population has standard
preferences and its complement exhibits self-control preferences, something that is consistent
with recent empirical evidence.
Our results are in line with those of previous studies in the social security literature with
agents featuring self-control preferences, in terms of emphasizing the welfare improving poten-
tial of taxes imposed on labor income.
However, an integrated assessment of the combined e⁄ects of the relevant trade-o⁄s, both
along the dimension of di⁄erences in preferences and along the dimension of the scope of capital
income taxation versus labor income taxation is missing from all previous studies (in both social
security and capital taxation literature) and this paper aims to ￿ll-in this gap and contribute
in this aspect.
We therefore identi￿ed and quantitatively assessed for the ￿rst time in the ￿scal policy
literature, yet another dimension of a trade-o⁄ which is due to the agents￿enhanced preference
speci￿cation, and the e⁄ect of its interplay with the formerly identi￿ed trade-o⁄s pertaining
to capital income taxation versus labor income and consumption taxation. It turns out that
this latter e⁄ect may reverse a well known result that was previously mistakenly attributed to
borrowing constraints, the life-cycle structure, or the stochastic nature of models.
Our results here document that if we take into account agents￿self-control problems, then
the highest welfare will be generated by signi￿cantly lower capital tax rates than those recently
documented in the literature. Given the strong empirical and experimental evidence with regard
to the existence of self-control problems, our model provides quite an interesting insight: the
optimal capital income tax rate will converge to Chamley and Judd￿ s rate as agents￿self-control
problems become more acute, and as the respective costs for resisting temptation get higher.
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